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Abstract 
 
A simple model of the firms’ decision to pay workers performance related pay (PRP) is tested 
using company level data for 1,001 UK private sector businesses.  From the basic sample 
statistics we observe that, on average, 26.5% of workers are covered by PRP systems.  Yet 
this hides the fact that only 50.5% of businesses have any workers at all covered by PRP.  Our 
empirical analysis offers support for the key hypotheses drawn from Lazear type PRP models, 
which emphasise the relations between firm size and implementation costs, and ease of 
measurement, as medium and large firms are more likely to have PRP systems.  However, 
these results are over-turned when we consider the extent of workers covered by firm level 
PRP systems if they are in place.  Here we observe that more workers are covered by PRP in 
micro and small firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we use company level data from a UK survey of private business carried out in 
2003 to analyse the determinants of performance related pay (PRP) coverage.   We define 
PRP as any system which links a workers pay directly to her output.  Hence we include 
standard piece rates, alongside alternative methods of linking pay and performance in line 
with, for example, Cowling (2000; 2001; 2002).  The main contributions of this paper are 
twofold:  firstly we use new data covering all sectors of the economy, and all size classes of 
firm; secondly, we are able to test for complementarities between PRP coverage, firm level 
objectives and strategies across four key areas, namely: innovation, human resources, 
governance, and customers & markets.  This brings us in line with the work of Heywood et al 
(1997) who used the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) to test for these types of 
effects on the incidence of PRP. 
 
The issue of PRP itself is an interesting one, linked as it has been to increasing labour market 
flexibility (Booth and Frank, 1996; Brown, 1997) and productivity improvements (Wadwhani 
and Wall, 1990; Cowling and Harding, 2003).  Others, notably Heywood et al (1997) have 
contended that the implementation of PRP systems, at the firm level, in worker contracts has 
contributed to a decline in the level of unemployment. For these reasons, amongst others, 
national governments have been active in their support for PRP in recent years in both the 
public and private sectors of economies.  This is set against the background of empirical 
evidence from Cowling (2001) that shows considerable disparities across the European Union 
in the proportions of private sector workers covered by PRP systems.  For example, in 
Finland 34% of workers were covered by PRP in 1996.  This compared to only 12% in the 
UK. 
 
The literature on PRP raises several key issues.  For example, the monitoring of workers is 
identified by Garen (1994), and Heywood et al (1997), as crucial to the decision to introduce 
PRP.  Booth and Frank (1996) and Lazear (1986;1996) all focus on the potential for PRP to 
attract high quality workers through its function as a sorting device.  Effort levels are 
common to all theories.  Brown (1997) outlined five key objectives of PRP systems, namely; 
attracting and retaining competent employees; to promote an achievement orientation; to 
reward good performance; to share the economic benefits of improved performance, and; to 
promote employee responsibility. 
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In terms of the theoretical underpinnings of PRP, Lazear (1986), later refined by Heywood et 
al (1997), developed models that focused upon the costs associated with the design of 
appropriate measurement systems that would capture output or performance correctly.  At the 
heart of such models is that the costs of designing and implementing a PRP system are fixed 
across firms.  Thus the costs per worker are lower the larger the employment size of the firm.  
The relevant trade-off here is the costs of worker supervision to elicit required effort levels 
from time-rate workers.  This type of model found strong empirical support from Cowling 
(2001) in a study of the EU-15. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
From Lazear (1986) and Heywood (1997) we assume that there are fixed costs associated 
with setting up an appropriate PRP system. In larger firms these fixed costs are spread across 
a larger number of workers, thus reducing the cost per worker.  The total monitoring costs for 
a firm of size L can be written as aL for time –rate workers.   The costs of a PRP system can 
be divided into fixed and variable, or per worker supervisory costs.  Total PRP costs can be 
written as F + gL, where F is the fixed costs element and g is the per worker supervision 
costs.  The rational firm only chooses a PRP system when per worker supervisory costs, given 
F, are lower under PRP.  This requires that a>g.  For smaller firms, supervision costs per 
worker are high, but in total they might be expected to be lower for time-rate systems in 
respect of the fixed costs, F, of designing and implementing a PRP system. 
 
For the individual worker, utility is derived from income, whilst effort represents a disutility.  
This can be expressed as Ui = Yi – C (Ei), where Y is income for E = Y, and C(.) is an 
increasing function where C′ and C″ are both positive.  Effort levels are assumed to be finite.        
 
 
We assume that the objective of the firm is to maximise profit.  This requires that workers 
compensation structure is such that they are willing to supply their labour time in the first 
instance.  Given labour supply, the firm then selects the most appropriate compensation 
structure to maximise profits.  Thus the firm maximises net surplus given increased effort but 
subtracting both the fixed and variable costs of designing and implementing a PRP system.  
For time-rate workers, monitoring ensures that workers supply a minimum effort level, 
although at the level of the individual she may choose to supply more effort (E>Emin).  As 
with firms, we assume that workers aim to maximise their net surplus when choosing between 
time-rate and PRP systems.  The workers decision is then to maximise e – C(e).  The decision 
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to opt for time-rates then becomes, Em – a – C(Em) > E* - (F/L +g) – C(E*).  Here, the left 
hand side of the equation relates to time-rates and the right hand side to PRP.  If Emin = E * 
then the decision between time-rates and PRP is solely based upon the unit monitoring costs.  
This implies that the greater the divergence between the two, the greater the probability that a 
PRP system will be implemented, as PRP induces higher effort levels all else equal. 
 
H1: The larger the employment size of firm, the greater the coverage of PRP.  This 
occurs as the costs associated with designing and implementing an appropriate PRP 
system are spread across more workers. 
 
An additional, and relevant, issue is that of product / service quality.  For example, Drago and 
Heywood (1995) and Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) argue that where quality is crucial to 
profitability, firms will avoid piece rates as they may be detrimental to quality and hence 
profits.  Thus whilst piece rates may stimulate output, quality may be the price of greater 
output.  This gives rise to a second testable hypothesis. 
 
H2: Where product quality is crucial to firm performance, PRP coverage will be lower. 
 
A further common strand in the literature is institutionalisation, which is related to 
embeddedness , or managerial intransigence.  Eisenhardt (1988), for example, suggests that 
even in apparently similar firms, management culture can be quite different.  For our purposes 
an important aspect of this might be different views on how best to motivate and incentivise 
workers.  A key point in her argument is that in some firms pay systems are so 
institutionalised that change is virtually impossible.  Empirical support for this view is found 
in Ichniowski and Shaw (1995), who identify worker age and managerial tenure as negative 
factors in the adoption of new work practices.  This gives rise to a third hypothesis; 
 
H3: In firms where senior executives receive share options as part of their overall 
compensation, then coverage of PRP will be higher. 
 
Thus far we have presented a model and drawn three testable hypotheses from the literature.  
Given the nature of our data we are able to empirically test these hypotheses alongside other 
issues of strategic complementarities, for example between other human resource practices 
and PRP coverage.  Here we draw on previous contributions in the industrial relations and 
human resource management (HRM) fields.  A common feature is that HRM practices are 
bundled (Cowling and Harding, 2003; Ichniowski et al, 1997), and further that 
complementary HRM practices can have large affects of performance (Macduffie, 1995).  In 
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line with, for example, Milgrom and Roberts  (1995), Meyer et al (1992), Macduffie and 
Krafcik (1992), we can test for strategic ‘fit’ across five key areas of management as, it is 
intuitively plausible that the gains from introducing PRP also raise the gains from introducing 
other, complementary HRM and strategic practices, particularly if complementarity is 
symmetric.  From this we can present two further hypotheses; 
 
H4: Higher PRP coverage will be positively associated with other, complementary, 
HRM practices and wider strategies consistent with output enhancement. 
 
H5: Higher PRP coverage will be negatively associated with other strategies linked to 
quality enhancement. 
 
Having framed five hypotheses, we now discuss the data to be used to empirically test them. 
 
 
2. The Data 
The data we use is drawn from a wider investigation into the competitiveness and 
performance of UK business.To this end, we draw upon data derived from a telephone survey 
of 1,000 UK businesses conducted in July 2003 by IFF Research on our behalf. The 
respondents to our survey were individuals at board level in their organisations or those who 
had a major input into the strategic decision-making process.  This requirement was necessary 
to capture detailed evidence concerning corporate objectives and company level strategic 
positioning.  One potential issue does arise from this in that high level strategic decisions may 
not permeate down to all levels of the company1.  The survey requirements were that we had a 
sample representative of the size distribution of UK business, of sectoral decomposition, and 
with adequate regional representation.  One caveat is that we had to top up sampling of the 
largest size class of businesses to ensure adequate numbers for meaningful analysis. 
 
 
4. Sample Statistics 
  
Here we discuss the basic sample statistics, differentiating by various firm level 
characteristics.  The headline figures are that 49.53% of firms have no workers at all covered 
by a PRP system.  The average coverage is 26.51% of workers per firm.  The median is 1% 
reflecting the left skewed distribution. 
                                                     
1 We thank Professor Rick Delbridge, Cardiff Business School for raising this issue. 
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Fig 1 
Distribution of Worker PRP Coverage by Firms 
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From Fig 1, we observe that the pattern is such that firms who have a PRP system at all tend 
to have either less than 10% of total workers covered, or more than 90%.  This tends to imply 
two things. Firstly only certain kinds of workers are motivated by PRP and/or have an easily 
measurable output.  This would explain the left peak for those that have any PRP system in 
operation.  Secondly, once a PRP system is in place, it is more cost effective, and possibly 
less divisive, to expand coverage to the whole workforce.  This might explain the relatively 
high concentration at the right hand side of the distribution. 
 
Table 1 (see appendices) shows that there are significant sectoral differences in PRP coverage 
(ANOVA test, F=3.77, Sig=0.005).  For example, in business services 34.38% of workers, on 
average, are covered by PRP.  This compares to only 22.13% and 22.96% in Other Services 
and Construction respectively.  Size of firm was also found to be a strongly significant 
determinant of PRP coverage (ANOVA test, F=10.48, Sig = 0.00001).  Here micro businesses 
(<10 employees) had on average 20.07% of workers covered by PRP.  This compares to 
26.08% in small firms (10-49 employees), 35.17% in medium-sized firms (50-249 
employees) and 38.94% in large firms (>249 employees).  This is generally supportive of the 
fixed costs of designing and implementing PRP systems being lower if they are spread over 
more workers, although whether this holds in a multivariate framework will be tested for in 
our subsequent analysis.   
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We also note an age effect.  Young firms (up to five years old) had, on average, 19.76% of 
workers covered by PRP.  This compares to 27.93% in more established firms.  This might 
suggest that it is easier to design an appropriate system of performance measurement when 
routines and procedures are established and fully operational.  In addition, we observe an 
establishment effect with single plant firms having much lower proportions of workers on 
PRP, 20.51% than multi-plant firms, 36.02%, (ANOVA test, F = 38.82, Sig = 0.00001). 
 
Turning our attention to proxies for product / service quality, we note that firms with a high 
quality focus are no more likely to have greater PRP coverage than firms not emphasising 
quality (26.2% compared to 28.7%, t-stat = 0.69, P>t = 0.49).  However, firms with a strategic 
emphasis on developing innovative products / services are more likely to have greater 
proportions of workers covered by PRP.  The respective averages for PRP covered workers 
are 30.55% and 22.93%.  This latter result is evidence in favour of rejecting H2, and the 
former not fully consistent. 
 
In the context of the institutionalisation, or embeddedness debate, we observe that firms in 
which senior executives receive share options have significantly higher PRP coverage 
amongst their workforces.  The respective proportions are 31.43% for firms with executive 
share options and 25.18% for those without (t-stat=2.11, sig=0.03).   This is consistent with 
H3 that hypothesises that firms with more forward thinking senior management teams will be 
less concerned about changing work practices. 
 
Finally we turn to the issue of complementarities, or strategic ‘fit’.  On this, we note that there 
are no statistically significant differences in workers covered by PRP according to product / 
service diversity, growth orientation, employee commitment, union representation, or well 
functioning communication lines.  However, a commitment to training and workforce 
development was associated with statistically higher PRP coverage.  The respective 
proportions of workers covered are 21.77% for low training commitment firms and 27.71% 
for high training commitment firms (t-stat = 1.94, sig = 0.05).  In addition, and consistent 
with the worker sorting argument, we observe that PRP coverage is significantly higher 
amongst firms able to attract high quality workers from industry competitors.  The difference 
is large at 30.65% compared to 21.25% (t-stat = 3.81, sig = 0.0001). 
 
To summarise, PRP coverage, from our univariate results, is highest in business service firms, 
in larger, multi-plant, public firms, in firms with a positive approach to new working 
practices, in older firms, and in firms where product / service innovation is important.  In 
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addition, firms with a commitment to training and those who are able to attract high quality 
employees all are more likely to have higher PRP coverage. 
  
 
5. Estimation 
 
Given the potential for selection effects to be present from both the firm and worker in the 
design and implementation of PRP systems and coverage, we choose to adopt a Heckman 
selection model (Heckman, 1976) which assumes an underlying regression relationship of the 
form; 
 
(1) yj = xjβ + u1j  [regression equation] 
 
The dependent variable, in this case worker PRP coverage, is not observed if the firm has no 
PRP system at all.  Thus the dependent variable, worker PRP coverage, for observation j is 
observed if; 
 
(2) zjγ + u2j > 0 [selection equation] 
 
where,   u1 ∼ N (0, σ) 
 
   u2 ∼ N (0, 1) 
 
   corr (u1, u2) = ρ 
 
 
When ρ ≠ 0, normal regression procedures can yield biased results.  To correct for these 
potential distortions we adopt the Heckman two-step estimator that generates consistent, and 
efficient, estimates for our model parameters.  These former effects may not be an issue for us 
if firms decide randomly to adopt a PRP system.  This is unlikely given the theoretical and 
empirical evidence presented in our literature review and model building.  
 
The actual models can be written thus; 
 
Step 1: Firm has PRP System = ƒ (firm demographics + strategic orientation + HRM systems 
+ geographical region) 
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Step 2: Workers Covered by PRP =  ƒ (firm demographics + strategic orientation + HRM 
systems) 
 
Using this two-step procedure, we then estimate the determinants of PRP coverage using our 
2003 UK firm level data. 
 
 
6.  Results 
 
The first point of note is that the selection term is significant.  The interpretation is that firms 
that design and implement a PRP system do so because they are more likely to have a high 
coverage of workers on that system.  This is consistent with spreading the fixed costs of the 
system over larger proportions of workers.  Thus the decision to adopt PRP is not random.  
From the selection equation, we note that firms located in Wales are significantly less likely 
to have PRP systems.  This might suggest that there are cultural, and/or institutional 
differences that mitigate against their adoption in this region.  Only two other effects were 
identified, a firm size effect and a sectoral effect.  On the former, we note that medium-sized 
firms are most likely to have a PRP system.  Large firms were also more likely to have a PRP 
system than small firms and micro businesses.  These results are consistent with the, per 
worker, fixed cost of design and implementation hypothesis, H1.  On the latter, we note that 
firms in Other Services are more likely to have a PRP system than firms in any other sector of 
the economy.  Further, we find little support for hypotheses H2-H5 that relate to quality, 
management practices, complementary HRM practices, and quality orientated strategies. 
 
From the PRP coverage equation, having taken account of selection effects, we only observe 
three significant effects.  Firstly, we again observe that Other Services firms are significantly 
more likely to have high worker coverage of PRP than those in all other sectors.  We also 
observe firm size effects, but in the opposite way to those identified in the selection equation.  
Here we find that coverage of workers by PRP is lowest in medium-sized firms, even though 
they are most likely to have a PRP system in place.  The same can be said about large firms, 
although the impact is smaller, albeit still strongly significant.  Age of firm was also identified 
as having an impact on PRP coverage, although the pattern is a little hard to interpret.  On this 
we note that five year old firms, three year old firms, and very old firms (>23 years old), in 
descending order of magnitude, had significantly higher PRP coverage.  Once again, we find 
little support for our other, non-size related, hypotheses. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Hypotheses and Empirical Findings 
Hypothesis Expected Sign PRP System Results PRP Coverage 
Results 
Firm size +ve +ve -ve 
Product / Service 
Quality Emphasis 
-ve 0 0 
Senior Management 
Share Options 
+ve 0 0 
HRM Strategies +ve 0 0 
Quality Focus 
Strategies 
-ve 0 0 
      
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have presented new empirical evidence relating to those factors that influence the 
decision to implement a PRP system, and subsequent worker coverage of PRP, using data 
from a large UK survey.  The results were then tested against five hypotheses drawn from the 
literature.  We find support for the firm size hypothesis to the extent that medium and large 
firms are significantly more likely to have a PRP system in place than smaller sized firms.  
But if smaller sized firms do have a PRP system in place, worker coverage is higher.  By 
contrast, we find little evidence to support our other hypotheses which relate to product / 
service quality, progressive management systems, and HRM systems.   
 
Crucially, we find that the decision to adopt a PRP system is not random implying that firms 
that do implement a PRP system are doing so with the intention of having high worker 
coverage.  This is consistent with reducing the per worker costs of designing and 
implementing a PRP system in the first place.  Finally, we observe that just over half of all 
UK firms have some form of PRP system in place, although on average only 26.5% of UK 
workers are covered by PRP.  This is significantly higher than the figure for 1996 reported in 
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Cowling (2001) for the UK, which was 12.0%.  One final point is that the univariate statistics 
are generally more supportive of our hypotheses than the multivariate results.  This suggests 
that omitted variable bias may be an important issue for empirical studies in this area.   
 
 
 
Table 1 
Univariate Statistics 
Variable PRP Coverage % Significance 
   
Size   
Micro 20.07  
Small 26.08  
Medium 35.17  
Large 38.94 0.00 
Sector   
Primary / manufacturing 24.75  
Construction 24.62  
Retail 22.96  
Business Services 34.38  
Other Services 22.13 0.01 
Legal Status   
Public Ltd 41.60  
Private Ltd 27.11  
Partnership 19.25  
Sole Trader 20.91  
Other 24.94 0.00 
Number of Plants   
Single Plant Firm 20.51  
Multi-plant Firm 36.02 0.00 
Senior Management Share Options   
Yes 31.43  
No 25.18 0.03 
Product / Service Quality Focus   
Yes 26.2  
No 28.7 0.49 
Innovation Led   
Yes 30.55  
No 22.93 0.00 
Product / Service Diversity   
Yes 27.59  
No 24.51 0.28 
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Growth Orientation   
Yes 28.37  
No 25.09 0.19 
Training Focus   
Yes 27.71  
No 21.77 0.05 
High Employee Commitment   
Yes 26.56  
No 26.02 0.90 
Trade Union Recognition   
Yes 25.96  
No 26.92 0.70 
Internal Communication Lines 
Function Well 
  
Yes 27.03  
No 21.75 0.20 
Attracts High Quality Workers from 
Competitors 
  
Yes 30.65  
No 21.25 0.00 
Notes: ANOVA oneway test and t-tests reported where appropriate. 
 
 
Table 2 
Heckman Selection Equation 
Variable Coefficient Z-stat 
Sector   
Construction -0.24 0.92 
Retail -0.10 0.53 
Business Services -0.14 0.73 
Other Services -0.73 2.72 
Base = primary / manufacturing   
Firm Size   
Small 0.27 1.17 
Medium 0.82 3.63 
Large 0.58 2.66 
Base = micro   
Legal Status   
Private Ltd 0.08 0.41 
Partnership 0.11 0.64 
Sole Trader 0.01 0.01 
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Base = public ltd   
Management Share Options 0.20 1.04 
Quality Focus 0.16 0.76 
Innovation Led 0.16 0.96 
Product / service diversity 0.04 0.26 
Growth Orientation -0.10 0.52 
Training Focus -0.22 0.95 
High Employee Commitment -0.11 0.43 
Trade Union Recognition 0.12 0.80 
Internal Communication Lines 
Function Well 
0.36 1.40 
Attracts High Quality Workers from 
Competitors 
0.04 0.25 
Region   
East 0.05 0.17 
London 0.15 0.65 
North East -0.05 0.24 
North West -0.14 0.70 
South East 0.01 0.09 
South West 0.35 0.86 
West Midlands -0.31 1.43 
Yorkshire & Humberside -0.02 0.15 
Wales -0.37 1.77 
Base = East Midlands   
Constant -0.57 0.79 
   
Selection term -45.89 18.50 
   
LR test of independent equations (ρ 
= 0) 
χ2 (1) = 77.58 Prob>χ2 = 0.0000 
 
Table 3 
Heckman Performance Related Pay Coverage 
Variable Coefficient Z-stat 
Sector   
Construction 16.07 1.55 
Retail 2.09 0.27 
Business Services 12.15 1.52 
Other Services 30.35 2.74 
Base = primary / manufacturing   
Firm Size   
Small -10.49 1.14 
 14
Medium -39.94 4.31 
Large -27.78 2.86 
Base = micro   
Legal Status   
Private Ltd -5.38 0.65 
Partnership 1.43 0.21 
Sole Trader -40.68 1.49 
Base = public ltd   
Single Plant -49.67 1.05 
Management Share Options -0.23 0.03 
Quality Focus -7.47 0.81 
Innovation Led 4.37 0.70 
Product / service diversity 0.52 0.08 
Growth Orientation -11.09 1.63 
Training Focus 9.32 0.95 
High Employee Commitment 3.14 0.33 
Trade Union Recognition -0.08 0.01 
Internal Communication Lines 
Function Well 
-3.72 0.36 
Attracts High Quality Workers from 
Competitors 
2.70 0.40 
Constant 48.67 1.67 
  
N obs 367 
Censored obs 127 
Uncensored obs 240 
Log likelihood -1351.257 
Prob > chi sq 0.0000 
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